

Faith in Democracy

An Editorial Introduction

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I. Introduction

Do free elections and procedural decision-making processes based on rational deliberation and dialogue suffice for the political legitimacy of democracy and its institutions? The question raises several concerns about the legitimacy of democracy and its institutions.

Far more than the democratic system, totalitarian regimes show a proclivity towards a so-called 'political religion.' That is, a political religiosity known to us from the French Revolution, Fascism in Germany and Italy, Communism in the former Soviet Union, Islamic politics and government in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Marxism in North-Korea. This obvious difference should not blind us to a fundamental similarity. Democracy is sometimes equally prone to totalitarian characteristics, and seems equally inclined to a self-compromising form of 'religiosity,' in different forms. Just as the aforementioned totalitarian regimes do, it can likewise entail a certain 'political religion.' As a consequence of democracy itself, such a political religion may undermine and eliminate the democratic potential.

Much has been written about this subject, for example by Cassirer, Voegelin, Talmon, and Bellah. Well-known advocates of deliberative democracy (Amy Gutmann, Seyla Benhabib, Amartya Sen, Joshua Cohen, or Charles Taylor) have criticised the pitfalls of the aggregative democracy.

2. Political Religion: A Naive Belief

'Political religion' can be defined as a critical concept that indicates a deceptive, dogmatic belief in and reverence for the values of some particular political system, its institutions, activities, techniques and machinations. Such a belief or religiosity in respect to politics in general also seems to be characteristic of and applicable to democracy: both of democratic thinking and of democratic practice. We will hypothetically mention a few aspects here.

One of our hypotheses is that democracy believes in (the criterion of) the opinion of the majority in seemingly religious ways. She believes in and appeals (so it seems) to the social consciousness of the masses who are above all interested in self-interest. In addition, the political religion surrounding democracy also appears to involve a seemingly unsuspecting belief in the principle of rational deliberation as central to political decision-making. Authentic deliberation, not mere voting, is, or so it seems, the most important source of legitimacy for the law.

Democracy in general implies (hypothetically speaking) a religion of values. Equality, logic, instrumentality, objectivity, impersonality, predictability, certainty, legality, laws and procedures are the object of a closed system of 'belief'. These characteristics of democratic rationality are sometimes respected and worshipped as if they were holy shrines. The democratic state and the sovereignty of its people are experienced (this is our hypothesis) as an immanent, divine Spirit. In addition, the rationalistic dogma of the strict separation of church and state and its practice (the *laicity* in France) also testifies to this phenomenon: to a political religious conviction and orthodoxy. Democracy promises (according to this hypothetical belief-system) that, through these revered sanctities, freedom, equality and brotherhood will be safeguarded and realised.

3. Conventionalism as a Political Religion

Our hypothesis is that, a quasi-religious conventionalism is an important, non-negligible constituent of the political religion characteristic of democracies. Democracy always expresses a conventional belief and represents a central value system. Truth, concepts, and people's understandings depend on conventions beyond which value systems cannot be justified. Particularly in the case of conflicting worldviews, forms of governance, and philosophies of

life, conventionalism can do a good job creating social identity and solidarity, political stability, and cultural consistency; it doubtlessly promotes human progress and wellbeing. In general, conventionalism interprets democracy as the ideal type of governance, as one that is natural, inevitable, and essentially unchangeable. These properties are interesting for the neutral observer as well; through democracy, inequality and poverty are mitigated (although not completely ruled out), and people's material wellbeing is protected.

This general perspective already applies to the nineteenth-century positivism of Auguste Comte which, without being explicitly political, was even explicitly religious; it had an associated religion, cult and liturgy. Twentieth-century legal positivism derived from this, and could equally be called religious. Legal theorists such as Hans Kelsen,¹ Herbert Hart,² and John Austin³ in particular were apologists of their version of legal positivism, in which the legitimacy of the discourse on individual rights is reduced to scientific and technological lawfulness or legality.

The 'religion' of lawyers and judges prescribed by these 'high priests' is the scientist's belief in (international) law as 'pure' science and technology; the legal concept knows (according to them) no further moral, spiritual or aesthetic dimensions. Modern political theory also testifies to this 'pure' doctrine: the contemporary naïve belief in the sanctity of the constitutional state is obviously not ecclesiastical. But it certainly seems to be religious in a political-religious sense.

This aspect of the political faith that seems to rule extant democracies could well threaten to undermine the integrity of the system. Cassirer's *Myth of the State*⁴ unmasks political religion as the illness of our time, which could easily turn into democracy's greatest enemy. Contemporary Critical Legal Study scholars such as Alan Hunt, Duncan Kennedy, and Karl Klare are concerned about the limitations of legal scholarship and practice in being able to create a more humane, egalitarian, and democratic society.⁵ Similarly, in interna-

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1. Hans Kelsen, *Pure Theory of Law* (1960; Knight trans.), Berkeley: 1967; Hans Kelsen, *General Theory of Law and State*, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2007.
 2. Herbert L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994.
 3. John Austin, *The province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1954.
 4. Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1961.
 5. Alan Hunt, 'The Theory of Critical Legal Studies', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1986): pp. 1-45; Duncan Kennedy and Karl E. Klare, 'A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies', *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 94 (1984): p. 461.

tional law and practices, acclaimed forms of democracy have been called into question.⁶

4. Religion and Faith

These hypotheses concerning a *democratic* political religion present the central concern of this book. 'Faith in Democracy' intends to examine the hypothesis of a democratic political religion undermining the constitution. It intends to give a critical assessment of the phenomenon and proposes some constructive alternative visions to the political naiveté and self-complacency surrounding democracy.

The authors of this book not only intend to signal, analyse and critically examine the very diverse phenomena that have been vaguely aligned under the banner of democracy: 'the rule by the people, over people, for people.' They also want to search for 'alternative perspectives,' not to democracy per se, but to the democratic-religious naiveté and fanaticism associated with the term. The alternative perspectives we intend to explore, would encompass a redemptive potential that needs further qualification. They do not necessarily imply any form of loyalty to a particular ecclesiastical or institutionalised belief system. It might very well be a secular or a secularised conviction: a 'faith in democracy' that could serve in offering a valuable antidote to 'believing atheism' and 'political religion.' The main promise of the book, therefore, is to discuss alternatives beyond the simplicity and one-sidedness of either atheism or political religion.

So, although the alternative itself might not necessarily be faith in the strict sense of the word (that is certainly not our proposition), we do mean to study in what way and to what extent the Jewish-Christian traditions, as well as the spiritual traditions of the East, Islamic Mysticism, (known as Sufism), or the Indian worldviews and spiritual perspectives, can inspire to such an alternative, 'open' form of universal spirituality⁷: to a religious, quasi-religious or mystical alternative to the political myths surrounding democracy.

6. See, for instance, José E. Alvarez on the Namibia Case. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Reparation Case, ICJ 1949; or the Behrami Case – ECtHR 2007 might be of interest to our readers.

7. This has best been explained, for instance, by Dances of Universal Peace: 'Spiritual practice brings us face to face with Life and Truth, prior to the concepts and beliefs of the person, opening to our true nature – authentic, unguarded, beyond form and im-

One is not, of course, to instrumentalise religion as a means for achieving political aspirations and goals. Doing so has all too often brought damage not only to religious traditions, but to politics as well.⁸ But what possible antidotes are available in the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity, and in other, non-Abrahamic, faith systems? What religious inspirations, derived from these religions, can be played out against the current, gullible idolatrous confidence in the democratic system?

5. Faith and Aristocracy

This brings us to another important hypothesis that deserves to be considered. Only a certain *authentic* faith can, or so it seems, prevent or eventually cure the disease of the political religion in the extant democracies. ‘Democratic enthusiasm’ can only (so it seems) be countered by resorting to an alternative religious passion or spirituality, although this might as well be accomplished by faith in a (secularised), more *existential* sense.

Hypothetically, this goal cannot be realised by ‘religion’ itself. In the sense that, and in so far as, religion is intrinsically ‘democratic’ (egalitarian and collective), it would seem that it cannot offer the antidote to the political religion of democracy. ‘Faith,’ on the other hand, is (hypothetically) aristocratic: it seems to point towards some kind of aristocratic spirituality that democracy needs. As such, ‘faith’ (not religion) might be beneficial to the limitations and dangers of a democracy in itself (left to itself). The temptations and dangers of a so-called ‘civil religion,’ a belief that we see (for example) in United States of America, but which was already found in ancient Rome, should – perhaps – best be tackled by ‘faith.’

6. Morality and Beyond

What is necessary for democracy is, or so it seems, an ethics that is trans-moral. If it judges so, this ethics would do so not in obedience to abstract moral and judicial laws, but according to its participation in a reality that transcends the barren

bued with the spaciousness and love that connects all.’ See <https://www.dancesofuniversalpeace.org> (last accessed 01/10/2019).

8. What this brings about can be seen (for instance) in contemporary Iran, where religion is used instrumentally to consolidate a particular kind of a totalitarian, autocratic, and hypothetical political power.

sphere of commands, rules and principles. The unbearable tensions within the sphere of the positive law drive us out of and beyond the sphere of morality. They point beyond good and evil in the moral sense, to 'the wholly other' for whom justice is sought; towards (what is called) the mysticism of the event and to a metaphysical or mystical justice that is in unity with life universal.

Following these hypotheses, we intend to ask, what sort of trans-moral conscience is needed to transcend religion and to accomplish a sustainable democracy? Can it benefit from the aforementioned religious traditions and in what sense? Is it through an ethics of decision-making or *Kairos*, beyond the alternative of absolute and relative ethics? Are we in need of a new theocracy or an eschatological ethics, open to the 'to come' which has not yet appeared? Do we need 'a creative fidelity' (Gabriel Marcel): an ethics as a work of art; as the creative realisation of the principle of love, or as a new and authentic response to the call of the other? Indisputably, (common) laws and institutions are necessary in order to maintain the actual ethical process: they are necessary as 'the strange work of love' (Martin Luther). But faith always necessitates to break through them, to suspend them in view of a new *Kairos*. Love in response to the neighbour inspires and enables to create new laws and new systems of ethics.

Following these introductory intuitions, one could well learn to understand justice in democracy as being the secondary and derived principle. The spiritual and mystical participation with life could well be seen as the creative and basic principle. Mysticism and spirituality could well have the benefit of transcending rigid ethical distinctions of good and evil: abstract, 'religious' concepts and categories (like 'the common good' or 'human nature') that keep us apart, divided and estranged. Through 'faith' democracy might be able to overcome the self-destructive forces that reside in rational ethical and judicial categories.

7. Prospects for a Democracy to Come?

Recent discussions of democracy share prophetic and messianic overtones. Democracy is always 'a democracy-to-come/or in the making.' It is never quite there. It is like a ghost that does not seem to fully present itself. No actual construction of democracy is adequate to what is calling upon us, to what is recalled by the name of democracy. Like a Messiah who never actually shows up, democracy never stops to disturb us with the promise of its coming: the promise of democracy never stops to haunt us. We should – in this respect – never stop hoping for the arrival of democracy. No democracy responds to all

that is called for in democracy. Deconstruction – as a philosophical practice – serves the purpose of giving attention to what seems to be calling under the name of ‘democracy,’ its institutions and principles. Justice is calling, and the soul of democratic man would have to be able to respond.

This ‘messianic’ approach towards democracy introduces new aspects of religion and faith; a ‘religion without religion’ (Derrida) that resides in a receptiveness to or hospitality for and a responsiveness to what cannot be ignored, let alone anticipated. These approaches and hypotheses are worth taking into in consideration.

8. Questioning Faith in Democracy

What faith is needed for a vital and resilient democracy (resilient to the political enthusiasm that we intend to question)? What alternative spiritual foundations of legitimacy, and what other democratic values and virtues can be distinguished? What religious courage is necessary for democracy? What to do against the autoimmunity of the democratic system: against the spiritual levelling that is inseparable from democracy, according to (amongst others) Kierkegaard and Tocqueville? What can be said on the soul of democratic man? What are the ‘aristocratic’ conditions of a democracy that successfully oppose anti-democratic tendencies in and of democracy itself: personal and spiritual conditions that democracy itself is not able to guarantee and organise? What politico-religious courage, what spiritual sovereignty is needed here, and implied in democracy?

What is the practical importance of these questions for the life-world in the condition of globality? How could faith in democracy improve the quality of democratisation of global institutions? In what way may faith in democracy contribute to a sustainable global development? How might it improve mutual understanding, ethics of recognition of difference, and deliberative cooperation on the road to a sustainable security? And how might it address the world of agony effectively?

9. General Outline

The questions raised above have been analysed by authors who have contributed their view of democracy in this volume. In a thematic order, and at the level of theory, the first part highlights the theoretical foundations of the move ‘from democratic faith to faith in democracy.’ Part two of the book explores faith in democracy in the broader context of politics.

The first chapter, by Timo Slootweg, questions ‘Democracy and the Human Soul.’ Democratic man is an individual, yet his individuality is characteristically problematic. Having to participate and be himself at the same time, he typically seems to lack a fixed identity. Democratic man seems to be both too much and too little of an individual. On the one hand, man threatens to be too much of an individual. In view of society, he needs to develop a social identity and ‘find himself’ through participation. According to some (Hegel), religion functions as the source of social cohesion. Religion grants man a super-individual and universal self. Furnishing man with a shared identity, faith can be seen as ‘the highest democratic institution’ (Tocqueville). On the other hand, as this article wants to point out, democratic man is in danger of being ‘not enough of an individual.’ The levelling powers of state and society compromise his singular responsibilities. Faith, in this view, would save by being ‘asocial.’ Religion frees humans from the inauthentic, social identity and his naïve belief in a general reason and ethics. It liberates him from becoming a submissive part of a larger whole (‘a function of the herd’), by profoundly questioning his identity. In reference to Augustine, Pascal and Kierkegaard, this first chapter argues that religion never fails to provoke a healthy strife, unrest and anxiety within the self. Eliminating our complacency, self-confidence and identity, faith turns man into a question mark and cultivates a receptiveness in relation to the other, which is of vital importance to ethics and politics. Democracy implicates the participation of a problematic soul that – as subject of obligation – does not coincide with himself. The institutional ideology of equality and effectivity demanding unrestricted dedication and identification, suppresses the perturbations and anxieties within the self. As such, it threatens to undermine democracy that thrives on the religious recognition (within the heart of public life) of the figure of the other.

In Chapter Two, ‘The Spiritual Soul of Democracy and the Normative Space of Participation,’ Mahmoud Masaeli extends the argument, but invites a careful attention to the spiritual dimension of the faith systems. If democracy literally means the common people (*demos*) ruled (*kratos*) by themselves to build an

inclusive society, he argues, the spirit of this form of governance can neither be reduced to the dynamics of presentation nor to the mere decentralisation of power. Rather, what inspires the spirit of democracy is a normative space of deliberative participation to make fair and reasonable decisions by citizens. The essence of democracy, therefore, is *deliberation* and not *aggregation*. Deliberative democracy emphasises an inclusive process of participation by the citizens to secure a conception of the common good through deep deliberation and reasonable arguments. He explores the role of spirituality as the spiritual soul of public deliberation. Through an engagement with Sufism, he argues that a cross-cultural conception of love motivates the citizens to participate in the deliberation, hence the space of participation gets a meaningful or normative essence. Commitment to love not only inspires the participant in the spiritual personal journey, but more importantly, assures the necessary requirements of a true public deliberation for the common good.

Ashish Pant's and Divya Sankaran's argument in Chapter Three is extended in line with the issues raised by the two previous chapters. In their piece, entitled 'From the Outer to the Inner: Psycho-Spiritual Perspectives on Faith in Democracy,' Ashish and Divya argue that although modern democracies are marked by the formal procedures that sustain the democratic system, this also produces the unintended consequence of marginalizing a multiplicity of voices. In tandem, current society with a bias for action and cognition neglects other human faculties and processes. The neglect of the whole human and multiple levels of reality, perpetuated by an acceptance of only a rational thought process and sensate level reality, is the biggest impediment to a deeper democracy. In a tight relationship with deliberative democracy, they place the conception of the whole human at the centre of Carl Gustav Jung's psycho-spirituality and the Deep Democracy approach of Arnold Mindell to introduce a broader template of being human in democratic practice. The infusion of a psycho-spiritual spirit into democracy to make it more meaningful requires a necessary pre-requisite for outer transformation toward a deep inner faith coupled with inner work to sustain democracy as a fulfilled hope.

'Theocracy and Democracy', the fourth chapter by Victor Kal, challenges the common view that 'theocracy' and 'democracy' can only be each other's enemy. First, it is argued that the idea of theocracy is not necessarily related to the idea of the state, and, second, that it is more plausible to relate the idea of theocracy primarily to the idea of individual freedom. In addition, in modern history this second relation has to be considered as considerably significant. In line with this, Kant explored the necessity of 'ein Volk Gottes' (a 'theocracy') as a social

institution in which the (modern) state could not have anything to say. After it has been made clear, firstly, that theocracy cannot be defined as a phenomenon in the sphere of the modern state, and, secondly, that modern democracy historically presupposes the individual freedom produced by radical theocracy, the main thesis of the article can be made plausible: there is some urgency of theocracy for democracy, and some urgency of democracy for theocracy. The problem today, however, is the fact that many people are able neither to define nor to experience the connection between informal theocracy (modern freedom) and formal theocracy (religious tradition). As a result, the skepticism theocracy would imply, and which freedom needs, is weakened.

In Chapter Five, Kathrin Bouvot also looks at the Christian faith as a counterbalance to individualism in democracy. Similarly, she also looks at the problematic of individualism in democracies, but emphasises the role of Catholic faith in politics' success. Her analysis, then, is oriented towards not necessarily the procedural dimension of democracy, but rather, to the outcomes instrumentally mediated by faith. Kathrin goes against Tocqueville and criticises religion as problematic, dissolving people's autonomy to take a critical stand in relation to religiously-made social truths. For her, the people can act in a morally good manner – so why then accept the authority of a religion? People are all able to understand through social and political praxis that a too individualistic conduct will undermine, sooner or later, any social cohesion and every political achievement of objectives. Therefore, the manhood is strong enough to be good to other individuals without being religious.

Chapter Six, by Rico Sneller, discusses the contribution of prophecy to democracy. In so far as prophecy consists of transmitting a dream about an ideal future – a conception which is not too far-fetched – it equates prophecy and idealism. Obviously, the prophetic character of political speeches is not beyond debate. While few would hesitate to attribute a prophetic nature to Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream' speech, to Nelson Mandela's call for forgiveness, or Gandhi's for non-violent resistance, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel's announcement that 'we can do it' (*wir schaffen das*) regarding the migration crisis is already less unambiguous. But, assuming that prophetic idealism exists, to the extent that its dreams are still dreams and have not yet come true, they do not suffice to keep alive – and even improve – a democracy. Dreams need to be supplemented by philosophical reflection, if not research. For its argument, the chapter draws on the German Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), the founder of the Neo-Kantian school in philosophy. This school tried to re-actualise Kantian thinking in the age of rising empirical science. As a

Jewish thinker, and in an age of rising anti-Semitism, Cohen refuted Christian claims that Judaism was obsolete and an obstacle to universalism or democracy. Drawing on Cohen's assessment on the insoluble link between Plato and the Jewish prophets, the chapter makes two distinct claims. Firstly, prophecy, despite its groundless nature, introduces an ideal which is inspired by love. This ideal regards a future of a united humanity. Secondly, philosophy needs to take seriously the implications of human reason; it is a holy spirit which unites people in sharing shareable ideas.

Part two of the book explores faith in democracy in the context of politics. The opening argument starts with Nikolaos Asproulis, who in Chapter Seven, '*Theosis*, the Secular, and Democracy: An Eastern Orthodox Perspective,' argues for the necessity of a neutral space, the secular, in between religious faith and democracy, as the necessary context within which an inclusive spirituality, determined by *theosis*, can be developed. Against the variety of rigorist and populist expressions present in all religious traditions, as well as in facets of political religion exemplified in contemporary forms of liberal democracies, a neutral place could provide the means towards a mutually respectful dialogue, the development of mutual reconciliation, forgiveness, co-existence and solidarity, a set of values shared by all people. By drawing on the Greek patristic and contemporary Christian theological understanding of *theosis*, and mainly Eastern Orthodox, understood as the core premise of Christian life, he critically overviews the basic commitments of the contemporary secular perspective. His intention is to provide certain prerequisites (existential concern, eschatology, etc.) towards a spirituality of the secular (an incarnational and embodied perspective), that could substantiate liberal democracy in its effort to overcome any inherent self-destructive pitfalls.

In Chapter Eight, Germán Bula offers a perspective of politics which is not really identified with religion. Under the title of 'The Atheism of Self-Made Men,' he illustrates the spiritual malaise caused by contemporary modes of production, and their attendant culture of consumerism and competition. Somehow similar to Nikolaos' argument in favour of a kind of spirituality that can overcome self-destructive tendencies of liberal democracies, Germán also meticulously looks at the mechanism of democracies. He makes a case for a political critique of capitalism damaging spirituality. This itself is caused by the atheism inherent in the idea of self-made men, and the radical irresponsibility of those whose minds are captured by wealth. To set his perspective in a convincing manner, he refers to the concept of plutoxia (intoxication by excess wealth), the tale of Erysichton in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, the idea of God in

Spinoza, the nature of the demonic in the *Bhagavad Gita*, and F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*. His argument reaches some prescriptive proposals as to how spirituality can be included in the public sphere.

In Chapter Nine, Aderemi Oladele offers a unique argument on democracy in Africa's cultural and identity context. In 'Faith in Democracy in Africa: Dethematising Concepts for Progressive Policies on Political Trust, Participation, and Development,' Aderemi centres on democracy, the interaction and influence of faith on democratic governance and political trust in the African context. The main tenet of his essay is to examine the carryover of traditional elements to modern or Western democracy, and the disruptions in the course of transition from traditional to modern beliefs in governance, democracy and how religion and faith still apply. By looking at 'political religion,' or democratic faith, vis-à-vis 'religion' or 'faith in politics,' and putting a point of interrogation on whether faith in Africa today has an influence on 'political trust' and participation or otherwise – Aderemi draws conclusions on what useful theories grasp Africa's concept of 'faith in democracy' and how the ensuing concepts, such as hybrid democratic systems, translate to useful policies on democratic development, political participation and sustainable development in Africa.

In Chapter Ten, Tatjana Kochetkova provides a unique case in her contribution to the book. 'Digital Totalitarianism: The Implications for Human Condition,' clearly manifests her argument that the social-credit system in today's life is a means of controlling individual's behaviour. This kind of digital totalitarianism adopted by China destroys democracy. The detrimental implication of the Chinese 'social-credit system' is observed in two interrelated directions; undermining the essential prerequisites of democracy, i.e., civil society and individual privacy, and controlling people's personal lives. To survive democracy, civil society must be empowered. However, this depends upon citizens' level of personal and consciousness development, their ability to exercise independent moral judgement, and their spiritual development.

In the final chapter, Gianluigi Segalerba analyses some aspects of Jürgen Moltmann's reflections on the central position of eschatology for Christianity, on the essential dimension of hope for Christian believers, and on the political implications of the Theology of the Cross. He shows that, in Moltmann's interpretation, God is, first of all, the God of Hope and the God of the promise of the new creation. God reveals Himself as the God of the promise of resurrection for everybody, of the promise of the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God, of the promise of the renewal of the world. The resulting emergence,

in Christian believers, of hope connected to a promise of a completely new dimension of future entails, in Moltmann's view, both a critical disposition of Christian believers towards the current conditions in the world and the strong intent to change the world. For Moltmann, Christian theology is essentially, therefore a theology implying precise political visions: these positions consist in fighting against any form of oppression; Christianity is and ought to always be directed towards the defence and the liberation of the oppressed, the poor, and the humiliated.

Moltmann's interpretation of hope has fundamental implications for the believers' practical life: as a consequence of their hoping in a complete renewal of the world, believers acquire a disposition of refusal of any form of injustice; they constitutively aim to produce a morally better society. Believers' hope in the realisation of God's promise entails the intent of anticipating the contents of God's promise. Hope is not passive expectation of the future; hope is not the expectation of just conditions holding exclusively in the afterlife together with a disposition of resignation for the events of the earthen life. Hope regards the here and the now: hope is, for the believers, the driving force of change and transformation of the world in the direction of justice, of equality and of rights. The principle of hope is, therefore, the root of the promotion of justice between men. Hence, faith connected with hope represents both the very foundation of civil and social rights, of a democratic society, and of equality between individuals, and the disposition to steadily strengthen, within civil life, the values of rights, of democracy and of equality.